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Abstract
This paper analyses oligopolies using the Cournot/Stackelberg frame-
work, but allowing some ﬁrms to be pursueing aims other than proﬁtm a x -
imisation. The existence of even a single output maximising ﬁrm can have
dramatic eﬀects on outputs, prices and welfare, even if such a ﬁrms faces
additional costs.
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1. Introduction
There is now a large literature on why ﬁrms may not always be proﬁt maximising.1
The reasons include the following possibilities, but are not restricted to them. 1.
Firms may wish to promote a certain output out of ideological convictions(fan-
clubs, churches, certain cultural organisations). 2. Owner managers may not be
willing to put eﬀort into increasing proﬁts above some minimum level. 3. Owners
may value the quality of their output.
The aim of this paper is to analyse the eﬀects that the existence of ﬁrms that
maximise something other than proﬁts will have on markets. It is not an aim
of this paper to discuss the reasons for such behaviour, as the focus is purely on
the eﬀects. While examples will be given, these are only meant to provide some
intuition rather than to imply that the results only apply in these cases.
Throughout the paper an oligopolistic market will be assumed. This is because
in such a market ﬁrms earn economic rents that they can choose to forgo without
risking to go out of business. In a perfectly competitive market however, ﬁrms
1See inter alia Rose-Ackerman (1996) for a survey.
2make zero economic proﬁts, even when maximising proﬁts and there is thus less
scope for alternatives to proﬁts maximisation.
If ﬁrms do not maximise proﬁts, there are inﬁnite possibilities of what they
may do instead. As early as in De Scitovszky (1943) the idea was expressed
that managers may in fact maximise something else. One possibility is that they
might try to maximise output, subject to making a minimum proﬁto fM.2 An
alternative interpretation of the same formulation is that the maximise output
subject to the constraint that they wish to break even, but that they face ﬁxed
costs of M. An example for such a behaviour would be a cultural organisation that
wishes to promote a certain cultural activity. Other examples include churches
a n df a n - c l u b s .N o t et h a ti fs u c ha no r g a n i s a t i o nr e c e i v e das u b s i d y ,t h e nM would
be negative, i.e. they would be allowed to be loss-making to some extent.
Without wishing to be exhaustive about the possible maximisation functions,
one alternative is considered. This is that managers might minimise output sub-
ject to a minimum proﬁto fM. An example of such an incentive would be an
owner-manager who values nothing more than his spare time and the avoidance
of eﬀort, but who needs a certain income.
2More common in the literature is the assumption that managers maximise utility, which
includes both proﬁts and sales (inter alia Vickers (1985)). While the set-up proposed here
seems very similar (with a zero weight on proﬁts), the results are quite diﬀerent due to the
non-linearity caused by the existence of a minimum proﬁt.
32. The theoretical set-up
The model used is the well-known oligopoly model of quantity competition devel-
oped by Cournot.3 The inverse demand function is assumed linear and normalised
to p =1− Q,w h e r ep is price and Q ≡
P
qi is total quantity produced, where qi
is output of ﬁrm i. Marginal cost are assumed away for now.
The reaction function of proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms in this setting are obtained












For ﬁrms that maximise quantity instead of proﬁts, the reaction function is
obtained by maximising output subject to proﬁts being greater than M.G i v e n
that proﬁts πi are decreasing in output for any output greater than the proﬁt-
maximising one, the solution can be obtained by solving:



























The relevant solution clearly is the one where both terms are added, as the
aim is maximise quantity. However in the case of the eﬀort-avoiding quantity-
minimising owner-manager, the relevant solution is the one where both terms are
subtracted.
3. Quantity maximisation
3.1. Assuming no ﬁxed costs
Assuming ﬁxed costs away simpliﬁes the algebra and reveals an interesting special






Solving for a Nash-equilibrium (NE) leads the following result:
5Proposition 1. In the absence of ﬁxed costs, quantity competition will lead to
marginal cost pricing and zero proﬁts if there is at least one ﬁrm that maximises
output subject to non-negative proﬁts. This result does not depend on whether
players move simultaneously or sequentially.
In the case of simultaneous moves, the best reply of the quantity-maximising
ﬁrm is always to increase output until the total quantity in the market reaches
1, at which point prices and proﬁts become 0. The proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms then
however always face an incentive to cut their output to earn at least some scarcity
rents. Therefore the only NE is the one in which only quantity-maximising ﬁrms
will produce. If the quantity maximiser is a Stackelberg leader, the same result
is obtained, because such a ﬁrm will choose to serve the whole market, knowing
that proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms will then cut their outputs to zero. The situation
is slightly more complicated if the proﬁt maximiser is leader. Then the proﬁt
maximiser knows that his proﬁts will be nil, irrespective of the output choice.
I fh eh a se v e na ni n ﬁnitesimal preference for larger output, he may well choose
to serve the whole market himself, given that no proﬁts are lost, but output is
gained. If he has no such preference, he can randomly pick any output including
zero.
At ﬁrst sight this result is attractive, as it shows that eﬃcient outcomes can
6be obtained by ensuring that one ﬁrm does not maximise proﬁts. Regulation of
uncompetitive industries could thus easily be achieved by setting up a public ﬁrm.
Furthermore this is costless, as this ﬁrm is breaking even. The result however also
has a number of drawbacks. First, it is not very attractive that proﬁt-maximising
ﬁrms cease producing (except possibly when they are Stackelberg leaders), because
that leaves one quantity maximiser as a monopolist. Second, it is not clear how
the eﬃciency of quantity-maximising managers can be ensured. After all, they
make zero proﬁts, whatever their actions. The game may become more realistic
by re-introducing ﬁxed costs or minimum proﬁts. These could either be because
the quantity-maximising ﬁrm has higher cost because of some ineﬃciency, or be-
cause the minimum proﬁt is needed to pay managers a salary if they successfully
maximise output.
3.2. Allowing ﬁxed costs or minimum proﬁts
In order to facilitate the exposition, it will from now on be assumed that there
are only two ﬁrms, ﬁrm 1 which maximises output and ﬁrm 2 which maximises
proﬁts.4 The reaction functions are then:
4To allow comparisons with the Cournot case, the results obtained with two ﬁrms facing




and W = 4













(1 − q1) (3.2)
A problem with this set of reaction functions is that the reaction function of
the quantity-maximising ﬁrm is not deﬁned over the whole relevant interval [0,1]
for any M>0. This is because for a positive M, there will always be an output of
ﬁrm 2 that is too high so that no reaction of ﬁrm 1 can ensure the minimum proﬁt
of M.I nt h a tc a s ei tw i l lb ea s s u m e dt h a tﬁrm 1 will simply try to come as close
to its required proﬁt as possible, i.e. in that case ﬁrm 1 will maximise proﬁts and
its reaction function will equal the Cournot one. The complete reaction function
can thus be described as a combination of an iso-proﬁtc u r v ef o rp r o ﬁts of M and

















(1 − q2) ∀1 − 2
√
M ≤ q2 ≤ 1 (3.3)
83.2.1. Simultaneous moves
There can be one, none or even multiple equilibria, depending on the level of M.
The following levels of M are interesting cases for which reaction functions are
depicted in ﬁgure 1:
• M =0 , i.e. no proﬁts required and the solution discussed above is obtained.
• M =1 /9, i.e. the Cournot proﬁt.
• M =1 /8, i.e. the Stackelberg proﬁt.
The reaction functions of ﬁrm 2 is depicted as a dashed line. The ones of
ﬁrm 1 are the solid lines, plotted for diﬀerent values of M.A s M increases,
ﬁrm 1’s reaction function shifts downwards. The lower bound is the Cournot
reaction function, which applies when minimum proﬁts cannot be reached at any
point, so that the ﬁrm just maximises proﬁts. The upper bound is the straight
line obtained in the case of zero-proﬁt requirement. In all intermediate cases the
reaction function will be a combination of an iso-proﬁt curve and the Cournot
reaction function.
I nt h ec a s eo faz e r o - p r o ﬁt requirement, the reaction functions cross in the
corner at point A as discussed above. When the required minimum proﬁti st h e
9Cournot one, the reaction functions cross twice, including at point C, the Cournot
outcome. The other equilibrium is at point B, where the quantity maximiser
produces more than the other ﬁrm. Total proﬁts must be lower, as ﬁrm 1 is
still making Cournot proﬁts and ﬁrm 2 clearly makes less than that. While the
equilibrium at point B is stable, the Cournot equilibrium at point C is stable from
the right only. An inﬁnitesimal cut in ﬁrm 2’s output will thus lead to the other
equilibrium. For any minimum proﬁtb e t w e e n0 and the Cournot proﬁt, there
will be a unique equilibrium between points A and B, where total output will be
greater than in the Cournot case and proﬁts lower.
If proﬁts are required to be at the Stackelberg level, there are again two possible
equilibria, one at point D, at which the Stackelberg outcome is reached, and one
at point C, where the Cournot outcome is reached. The Stackelberg outcome is
stable from the left only. Any random increase by the proﬁt-maximiser will lead
to the Cournot outcome. At the Cournot outcome, the quantity maximiser is not
making the required proﬁt though. He may give up so that a monopoly would
result. For proﬁts between the Cournot and the Stackelberg ones, there will be
three equilibria, one between B and D (stable), one between D and C (unstable)
and one at C (stable). In that case the eﬃciency enhancing equilibrium is stable,
although the Cournot outcome, which may lead to monopoly, is so as well.





























Finally, if required proﬁts are more than Stackelberg ones, the only equilibrium
will be the Cournot one, where however the required proﬁts are not reached.
3.2.2. Sequential moves
While the sequence of moves did not matter much in the case of no ﬁxed costs,
t h eo u t c o m e sa r en o wa ﬀected by who moves ﬁrst.
Assume ﬁr s tt h a tt h eq u a n t i t y - m a x i m i s i n gﬁrm is the Stackelberg leader. It
will pick the point with the highest output for its required level of minimum
proﬁts that lies on the other ﬁrms reaction function. In other words, the leader
will choose the point with the highest output of those points where its iso-proﬁt
curve cuts the other ﬁrm’s reaction function. But remember that the upper part
11of the quantity-maximiser’s reaction function is just the iso-proﬁt curve. Hence
nothing changes in those case where there is already a unique equilibrium on the
interval (A,B) in Figure 1, i.e. when the required proﬁts are less than Cournot-
proﬁts. For minimum proﬁts at or above the Cournot level, the only change is that
now the equilibrium with the higher output, i.e. the on on the interval [B,D),
will now be the unique equilibrium. For minimum proﬁts at the Stackelberg level,
unsurprisingly exactly the Stackelberg solution is obtained.
The situation is diﬀerent if the proﬁt maximiser is leader. Suppose ﬁrst that
minimum proﬁts are relatively high. In that case, the quantity maximiser’s reac-
tion function will be identical to the Cournot reaction function at the range that
is relevant. The outcome will thus be the standard Stackelberg solution with the
leader producing q2 = 1
2 at a proﬁto fπ2 = 1
8 and the follower producing q1 = 1
4 at
ap r o ﬁto fπ1 = 1
16. This solution is obtained for any minimum proﬁto fa tl e a s t
the Stackelberg follower proﬁts. Note though that any minimum proﬁt in excess
of Stackelberg follower proﬁts cannot be reached by the follower. For lower proﬁts,
the solution will be diﬀerent, because the follower’s reaction function will not be
identical to the Cournot one anymore on the relevant range. The optimal solution
for the leader then is locate at the corner of the followers reaction function, i.e.
at the point where the reaction function changes from an iso-proﬁt line to the
12Cournot reaction function. The solution to the game where the proﬁt-maximising
ﬁrm is leading therefore are:












Note that in that case the quantity-maximising ﬁrm reaches its minimum proﬁt




4∀0 ≤ M ≤ 1







1 − 8M∀0 ≤ M ≤ 1
8).
3.3. Welfare
If M represents a minimum proﬁt or a payment to managers, then the welfare
analysis is straightforward. Any outcome with outputs higher than in the Cournot
case will be welfare enhancing. If M however represents a cost, then its detrimental
eﬀect on output should be accounted for. In the simultaneous move case, total
output is always greater than or equal to the Stackelberg output (of 3/4). Welfare
13must be higher than in the standard duopoly case if M represents minimum proﬁts
or a payment to managers. If M however represents an eﬃciency cost, then welfare
is given by:
















Note that welfare is decreasing in M. By comparing it to the Cournot welfare
(of 4/9), we can calculate the maximum M, up to which having a quantity-


















Hence even if there are ﬁxed costs to being a non-proﬁt maximising ﬁrm,
welfare will be enhanced as long as these costs are less than about half the Cournot
proﬁts.
14A similar result is obtained for marginal costs. Suppose the quantity-maximising
ﬁrm faces ﬁxed marginal costs of c. The reaction functions then become:




(1 − q1) (3.8)
The equilibrium is then given by:
q1 =1 − 2c
q2 = c
Q =1 − c (3.9)
Output in the Cournot case would be 2/3. Therefore a market with a quantity
maximising ﬁrm which faxes a marginal cost, will lead to higher total output
as long as marginal costs are not greater than 1/3. If costs are any higher, the
outcome will be worse than Cournot (but better for the proﬁt maximiser). As
15costs reach 0.5, the quantity-maximising ﬁrm will not produce any output and
the maximiser becomes a monopolist. Welfare must now be adjusted for the cost
incurred by the quantity-maximising ﬁrm:






















We now turn to the "lazy" owner-manager. The set-up of the problem is exactly
the same, just that know the two terms in equation 2.3 are subtracted rather than
added. In the case of zero required proﬁts, this unsurprisingly leads to the result
that such a ﬁrm will not produce. However, for a positive amount of minimum
proﬁts, both ﬁrms will produce. As shown in ﬁgure 2, equilibrium can be reached
for minimum proﬁts up to and including the Cournot proﬁt. The single equilibria
are always between A and B.I f p r o ﬁts are required to be larger than Cournot
16ones, the reaction functions still only cross in the Cournot point. Higher proﬁts

























1 − 8M (4.1)
The welfare analysis is straightforward. Even without any extra costs, be they
ﬁxed or marginal, welfare is generally lower than in the Cournot case, except when
required proﬁts are the Cournot ones, in which case welfare is the same. Intuitively
this is because the quantity maximising ﬁrm, will always reduce output if its
proﬁts turn out to be higher than expected. The proﬁt-maximising ﬁrm will react
to that by increasing output, although by less than the reduction, because the
proﬁt-maximiser takes the marginal revenue eﬀect of higher output into account.
175. Conclusion
This paper has shown that the welfare in an oligopoly can be enhanced if there
are ﬁrms that maximise output instead of proﬁts. If they require zero proﬁts,
they will in most circumstances drive out any proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms. If required
proﬁts are positive, but below Cournot proﬁts, market output will be higher and
prices lower. If proﬁt sa r er e q u i r e dt ob ee v e nh i g h e r ,b u tb e l o wS t a c k e l b e r go n e s ,
there will be multiple equilibria, more than one of which may be stable. Welfare
is generally found to be increased by the presence of such ﬁrms, unless they face
substantial additional eﬃciency costs.
It is also shown that there can be equilibria with output-minimising ﬁrms,
which can be thought of as lazy owner managers. The presence of such ﬁrms can
only diminish welfare.
At the risk of overstretching this simple model, the following conclusions for
policy can be drawn. It may well be in the public interest to have a ﬁrm which is
not forced to maximises proﬁts in an oligopolistic industry. This is even beneﬁcial
if there are eﬃciency costs, provided they are not too large. Hence, simply showing
that a nationalised ﬁrm is less eﬃcient than the private sector is not a suﬃcient
argument for privatisation, as the net eﬀect on welfare could still be positive.
18There is a lot of anecdotal evidence of non-proﬁt maximising behaviour in small
owner-managed establishments. Take as an example a small shop oﬀering bad
service despite being in competition with a supermarket. The model shows that
such a shop is not necessarily doomed to failure, but may survive in equilibrium.
This short paper can at best shed light on some of the issues of non-proﬁt
maximising ﬁrms in oligopolistic markets. Dynamic models could change the
results, particularly if ﬁrms have the opportunity of pretending to be of one type
in some periods and then to change tactics.
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Figure 2: Reaction functions for different minimum profits of a 
quantity-minimising firm